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SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
Volume XXXV 2001 Number 2 
Formalism, Realism, and the War on Drugs· 
David D. Colet 
Upon graduation, one of my law school classmates became an Assistant 
United States Attorney (AU SA) in a major city in the Northeast, where he 
found himself prosecuting federal drug cases. Like Supreme Court Justice 
Clarence Thomas reportedly reacted upon seeing a man taken into custody, my 
friend had a "there but for the grace of God go I" reaction. I My friend is an 
ambitious, smart white man who grew up in the Midwest, and worked hard to 
get where he is today. In his eyes, but for their race and class, the young men 
he was prosecuting were strikingly similar to himself. They were the 
entrepreneurs of their community-the ones with ambition, drive, and a 
willingness to work hard. But the way to get ahead in their community was not 
to do well on exams, join the debate team, and go to an exclusive Ivy League 
college, but rather to deal drugs, earn lots of money, and buy a fancy car. My 
friend felt that had he grown up where these defendants grew up, he too might 
well have been involved in the drug trade, and might well have found himself 
on the other side of the courtroom. 
Like most wars, the war on drugs has had a devastatingly disparate impact 
on minorities and the poor. Even though illegal drug use appears to be an equal 
opportunity offense, blacks and the poor are disproportionately arrested, 
• This article is based upon a speech delivered on April 12,2001 as part of the Donahue Lecture Series. 
The Donahue Lecture Series is a program instituted by the Suffolk University Law Review to commemorate the 
Honorable Frank J. Donahue, former faculty member, trustee, and treasurer of Suffolk University. The Lecture 
Series serves as a tribute to Judge Donahue's accomplishments in encouraging academic excellence at Suffolk 
University Law School. Each lecture is designed to address contemporary legal issues and expose the Suffolk 
University community to outstanding authorities in various fields of law. 
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Yale University; J.D., Yale Law 
School. 
1. The Thomas Hearings: Excerpts/rom the Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 1991, at AI8 (quoting Clarence Thomas). Thomas stated that when he looks out the window from his 
courthouse office and sees criminal defendants being bused into court, "I say to myself almost every day, but 
for the grace of God there go J." Jd. 
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convicted, and incarcerated for drug offenses. This essay argues that the war 
on drugs is sustainable only because of that disparity, and that society's 
response to drugs would be very different if we were willing to take full 
account of, and responsibility for, that disparity. We can only afford to be as 
tough on drugs as we are because those who are sent away for years of their 
lives for relatively minor roles in the drug trade are overwhelmingly minorities. 
One of the ways our legal system has avoided confronting this ugly reality is 
through a commitment to legal formalism. Legal formalism allows us to ignore 
the social determinants that my AUSA friend saw every day as he prosecuted 
federal drug cases. As my colleague Professor Michael Seidman has 
suggested, legal formalism, which has been effectively critiqued and displaced 
by legal realism in many other areas of law, continues to exercise considerable 
influence over the way we think about criminallaw.z This formalist approach, 
in my view, has strongly affected the way we approach the drug problem. One 
consequence is that we continue to pursue an increasingly futile war on drugs 
and refuse to see the issue in its broader, realist dimension. A little realism on 
the subject of drugs, I suggest, would go a long way. 
There is much to be said for formalism in the criminal law. Formalism, with 
its commitment to fair procedures, clear rules, and restricted discretion, is a 
necessary part of any fair system of criminal law. The sanctions involved in 
the criminal system are too severe to permit them to be allocated in an open-
ended discretionary or regulatory manner. The criminal law's commitment to 
formalism is thus not a fault, but a strength. Discretionary regulatory schemes 
too often invite subjective judgments susceptible to abuse, prejudice, and 
favoritism. Formalist rules, by contrast, are built on the promise of treating 
likes alike. Precisely for this reason, however, we ought to reconsider whether 
the criminal approach makes sense when there is substantial evidence that the 
commitment to equality has been seriously compromised. Our dual 
commitments to equality and to the reduction of the human damage that drug 
abuse inflicts suggest that we should reduce our reliance on the criminal justice 
system. Alternative approaches, such as treatment and rehabilitation, promise 
to be both more effective and more fair. 
I. REALISM AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
In an important and perceptive article, Professor Michael Seidman argues 
that the criminal law has in significant respects remained immune from the 
legal realist revolution in American law.3 The criminal law rests on core 
assumptions that fit the formalist worldview much more comfortably than the 
2. See generally Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of 
Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97 (1996). 
3. Id. at 97-98 (stating criminal law remains formalist in a legal environment dominated by realism). 
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realist worldview. One cornerstone of the criminal justice system, for example, 
is free will and individual responsibility. It is legitimate for the state to lock up 
human beings only because they are said to be blameworthy, or responsible for 
their bad acts. To be blameworthy, one must act with free will. If one's 
actions are not the product of free will, one cannot be held responsible for 
them, and punishment is inappropriate. The criminal law's focus on individual 
responsibility, Seidman argues, reflects a formalist conception that has long 
been considered outmoded in other areas of law, where legal realist insights 
have revealed the shortcomings of the formalist approach. 
Consider, for example, Lochner v. New York,4 a familiar example of legal 
formalism and its faults. In Lochner, the Supreme Court sustained a 
substantive due process challenge to a law that set maximum hours for bakers, 
reasoning that the law infringed upon the liberty of contract. The Court 
concluded that the law was an attempt to regulate labor relations between 
bakery owners and employees, and that it impermissibly interfered with the 
parties' right to contract. In the Court's view, the "liberty" protected by the due 
process clause rendered suspect any regulation of labor relations, and in 
particular any attempt to redistribute economic bargaining power. This view in 
tum was predicated on the formalist assumption that the right to contract was a 
pre-political natural right, from which any departure through "regulation" 
required a compelling justification. 
The realist critique of Lochner maintains that there is no such thing as a pre-
political freedom of contract.s Contractual relationships reflect disparities in 
bargaining power that are themselves constructed, affected, and maintained by 
the law of contracts. These disparities in bargaining power substantially reduce 
the reality of free choice for many in contractual negotiations. According to 
this view, the Court's mistake in Lochner was to accept the market status quo 
and the common law as a neutral "state of nature" baseline. Realists contended 
that the status quo and the common law were neither natural nor neutral, but 
were determined by legal rules and social choices that privileged some while 
disadvantaging others. Bakers, the realists argued, simply did not have the 
same freedom to contract as owners. From this perspective, contractual 
relations are already constructed by legal regulation, and thus it is legitimate to 
structure regulations for the common good, particularly for the purpose of 
leveling the playing field and reducing labor exploitation. 
The Supreme Court has long since repudiated Lochner. As Professor 
Bernard Siegan has put it, Lochner" is one of the most condemned cases in 
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
5. See generally Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 POL. 
SCIENCE Q. 470 (1923) (arguing bargaining power is function of legal rules and not part of pre-existing natural 
order). 
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United States history and has been used to symbolize judicial dereliction and 
abuse.,,6 There are multiple reasons for the demise of the Lochner regime, one 
of which was undoubtedly the rise of legal realism and its critique of legal 
formalism. It is no longer acceptable to argue that the law cannot have 
redistributive consequences because there is no such thing as law without 
distributive consequences. This follows logically from the realization that the 
status quo is constructed by law. Today, unlike in the days of Lochner, 
government regulation of markets is seen as inevitable. We hang on Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's interest rate announcements, but we do 
not question the government's role in setting that rate. Whereas formalists 
assumed autonomous individuals exercising free will in a state of nature, 
realists hold a more deterministic view of world, seeing the law as a set of 
incentives to regulate social relationships, to prevent problems, and to advance 
social welfare. In Professor Seidman's terms, realists see the law as regulatory 
rather than natural. 7 
This realist revolution has largely bypassed the criminal law, which has 
remained formalist at its core. The criminal law's focus on individual 
responsibility and blameworthiness assumes that the status quo is neutral, and 
that individuals' choices are the product of free will and not socially 
determined. 
There are good reasons for the criminal law's formalist assumptions. For 
one thing, as Seidman acknowledges, the assumption of free will reflects how 
most of us experience the world.8 Even those who believe in a strong form of 
material or social determinism tend to act as if they exercise some sort of free 
will in their daily lives; indeed, acting in the world would probably be 
impossible without such an assumption. Further, concepts of individual 
responsibility and free will have a valuable impact on social behavior. These 
concepts instill each of us with a sense of responsibility for our own fate. 
Indeed, to act freely is central to our conception of human dignity. 
At the same time, formalist commitments are important because they reduce 
reliance on discretion. The criminal sanction is the most severe that a 
democratic society can impose on its citizens. The severity of the sanction 
demands that it be applied with scrupulous neutrality. Thus, while race-
conscious affIrmative action in the distribution of job opportunities or college 
admissions is widely practiced (and debated), race-conscious decision making 
in the criminal setting is widely viewed as unacceptable, even if undertaken to 
6. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (1980). 
7. Seidman, supra note 2, at 102 (arguing regulatory approach flows from realist approach). Seidman 
further asserts that a rejection of the concept of natural rights has allowed the law to attempt to redistribute 
resources and to strive to reach optimal social outcomes. Id. 
8. Seidman, supra note 2, at 162 (acknowledging even those who espouse theory of social determinism 
live as though making free choices). 
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benefit minorities. The heightened significance of equality in the criminal 
justice system supports the criminal law's commitment to fonnalist rules. 
Despite its surface commitment to fonnalist rules, however, the 
administration of the criminal law is also shot through with discretion. Police 
officers exercise discretion in determining where to patrol, whom to question 
and stop, whether to arrest, and what charges to propose. Prosecutorial 
discretion is also notoriously wide-ranging, as prosecutors wield authority to 
drop or add charges to an indictment, and to decide whether to negotiate plea 
agreements. Juries, which reach their decisions in the black box of the jury 
room, exercise largely invisible and unreviewable discretion. Judges wield 
discretion in their pretrial orders, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and 
sentencing decisions. Moreover, the criminal justice system depends upon 
these discretionary interstices, and would likely be unworkable without them.9 
The law insists, however, that all of these discretionary decisions be made in 
a formally colorblind fashion. If police, prosecutors, juries or judges rely on 
race to guide their discretion, whether to aid or to harm a minority group, their 
decisions are by definition illegitimate and unconstitutional. Thus, while the 
criminal law depends upon the exercise of discretion, it insists that such 
discretion be exercised in keeping with the criminal law's fonnal commitment 
to equality. 
At the same time, we recognize that in the real world, all persons do not 
have the same ability to act autonomously. "Free will" is a relative concept, 
and social circumstances significantly affect and determine behavior. The 
choices facing a young black man in the ghetto of Camden, New Jersey are 
starkly different from the choices that my AUSA friend faced growing up in a 
Midwest suburb. Yet we steadfastly refuse to consider that reality in the 
criminal justice system. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, 
expressly forbid any consideration of race or socioeconomic status in 
sentencing. IO As a constitutional matter, deciding whether to prosecute on the 
basis of race or socioeconomic status is clearly impermissible. II In criminal 
law, formal colorblindness is the rule, and probably should be. 
Reality, however, rarely conforms to the rule. Consider the following facts. 
A 2000 study of 2800 homicide cases randomly selected from thirty-three 
urban counties found that the race and sex of the victim had a substantial effect 
on homicide sentences, even after controlling for other variables, such as 
9. See David Cole, Whol·s Criminology GOI 10 Do Wilh II?, 48 STAN. L REv. 1605, 1617 (1996) 
(recognizing discretionary determinations integral to administration of criminal law). 
10. u.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL §§ 5H1.I0, 5K2.12 (2001) (stating race, sex, national origin 
and economic status irrelevant to determination of sentence). 
11. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding selective prosecution based on race or national 
origin unconstitutional). 
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criminal history, type of offense, and details of the crime. 12 These disparities 
held true even for vehicular homicides, in which victims are almost always 
random and blameless. All other variables being equal, a drunk driver who 
kills a woman will receive a sentence more than 50% longer than one who kills 
a man, and a driver who kills a black victim will receive a sentence 50% shorter 
than one who kills a white victim. The system seems to "value" the lives of 
white female victims more highly than any others. 
These findings are consistent with Professor David Baldus's famous study of 
the Georgia death penalty.13 Baldus conducted a detailed statistical analysis of 
more than 2,000 murder cases in Georgia in the 1970s. He found that after 
controlling for thirty-nine nonracial variables that might explain apparent racial 
disparities, those charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times more likely 
to receive the death penalty than those who killed black victims. 14 Thus, the 
race of one's victim was a significant determinant in whether a murderer in 
Georgia received a sentence of life imprisonment or of death. Other studies of 
the death penalty have found similar race-of-victim disparities. In 1990, the 
General Accounting Office reviewed twenty-eight studies concerning race and 
the death penalty, and discovered that 82% of them found the race of the victim 
to be a significant factor in whether a defendant received the death penalty. 15 
A 1998 study by George Bridges and Sara Steen found that juvenile 
caseworkers were much more likely to attribute delinquent behavior to innate 
characteristics when committed by black youth than when committed by white 
youth. 16 The caseworkers were more likely to explain white youth's behavior 
as a result of their social environment, and more likely to label minority youth 
as "bad kids." These attributions in tum affect predictions of future 
dangerousness and sentencing of juvenile offenders, contributing to harsher 
treatment for black youth. These findings suggest that while colorblindness 
may be the formal rule of the criminal justice system, the reality is that race 
matters. 17 As the following section illustrates, nowhere is this more true than in 
12. EDWARD L GLAESER & BRUCE SACERDOTE, THE DETERMINANTS OF PUNISHMENT: DETERRENCE, 
INCAPACITATION AND VENGEANCE I, 13-14 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7676, 2000). 
13. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 314-16 (1990). 
14. [d. at 315 (explaining study used cross-tabular analysis requiring large sample size); see also 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (stating Baldus study of over 2,000 murder cases indicates 
disparity based on race of victim). The McCleskey Court found that the Baldus study did not establish an equal 
protection violation, because it did not establish that McCleskey's particular death penalty was imposed 
because of race. [d. at 292 n.7. 
15. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF 
RACIAL DISPARITIES 5-6 (1990) (stating synthesis of studies indicate racial disparities in capital sentencing). 
16. See generally George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile 
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. Soc. REv. 554 (1998). 
17. See generally DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); see also generally MARc MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999) (tracing racial 
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the war on drugs. 
II. REALISM AND THE WAR ON DRUGS 
The best evidence suggests that the use of illegal drugs is evenly distributed 
by race. The leading indicator of drug use is an annual anonymous household 
survey conducted by the United States Public Health Service. This self-report 
study indicates that drug use is roughly proportionate across the racial 
spectrum. In 2000, 6.4% of whites and of blacks, and 5.3% of Hispanics 
reported using illicit drugs. IS 
Similar self-reporting data on drug distribution does not exist. Some suggest 
that minorities dominate the drug distribution trade, pointing anecdotally to 
inner-city drug markets run by minorities and frequented by white suburban 
buyers. On the other hand, a 1997 Justice Department study found that most 
users report getting their drugs from dealers of the same race, so the 
demographics of distribution likely reflect the demographics of drug use. 19 
Racial profiling studies also support the proposition that drug use is an equal 
opportunity offense. These studies, mandated by many jurisdictions across the 
country in recent years, track the racial patterns of stops and searches on the 
nation's roads and sidewalks and at the borders. Profiling stops and searches 
are primarily designed to find contraband, mostly drugs. Studies consistently 
show that police officers disproportionately stop and search African-Americans 
and Hispanics.20 The consistency of this finding across multiple jurisdictions 
and officers suggests that profiling is not the work of a few rogue racist police 
officers, but the result of a broadly shared assumption that blacks and Hispanics 
are more likely to be carrying drugs or other contraband than whites. 
The actual results of the searches refute this assumption. If it were true that 
blacks and Hispanics were more likely to be carrying drugs or contraband, one 
would expect the police to find more contraband on the blacks and Hispanics 
they stop and search than on the whites they stop and search. Yet reported "hit 
rates"-the proportion of searches that actually reveal contraband-are as high 
or higher for whites as for minorities. In Maryland, 73% of drivers the police 
stopped and searched on 1-95 were black, yet equal percentages of whites and 
blacks searched had contraband.21 In New Jersey, where police have admitted 
politics and disparities in exponential rise in incarceration in United Slates from 1970s to present). 
18. Substance Abuse and Menial Health Services Administration, Summary of Findings From the 2000 
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (200 I), at http://www.samhsa.gov/oaslNHSDAI2kNHSDN 
chapter2.htm (last visited June 22, 2002). 
19. K. JACK RILEY, CRACK, POWDER COCAINE, AND HEROIN: DRUG PURCHASE AND USE PATTERNS IN 
SIX U.S. CITIES I (National Institute of Justice, 1997). 
20. See DAVID HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 49-72 (2002) 
(collecting studies of racial profiling). 
21. David Cole & John Lamberth, The Fallacy of Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, at 013 
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to racial profiling, 10.5% of whites and 13.5% of blacks were found carrying 
contraband.22 Based on data from January 1998 to March 1999, the New York 
Attorney General reported that while New York City police were 6 times more 
likely to stop and frisk blacks than whites, and four times more likely to stop 
and frisk Latinos than whites, their hit rates were 12.6% for whites, to.5% for 
blacks, and 11.3% for Latinos.23 And while 43% of those searched by United 
States Customs in Fiscal Year 1998 were minorities, only 6.7% of whites, 6.3% 
of blacks, and 2.8% of Latinos had contraband.24 These fmdings suggest that, 
contrary to the assumption that drives racial profiling, whites are just as likely 
as blacks to be carrying drugs or other contraband. 
The racial profiling studies also make clear that the war on drugs has largely 
been a war on minorities. It is, after all, drug enforcement that motivates most 
racial profiling. The Drug Enforcement Agency's Operation Pipeline, which 
trained state police in drug enforcement on the highways, specifically trained 
officers in racial profiling.25 People carrying drugs do not look very different 
from people carrying school supplies or groceries, and thus police often resort 
to racial stereotypes in selecting whom to approach and stop, and specifically 
rely on the stereotype that minorities are more likely to be carrying drugs than 
are whites. 
The disproportionate targeting of minorities does not stop on the nation's 
highways, but extends to general drug arrest and incarceration rates. For 
example, while blacks represent only 14-15% of drug users, in 1995 they were 
35% of those arrested for drug possession, 55% of those convicted for drug 
possession, and 74% of those sentenced to prison for drug possession?6 
Although African-Americans committed drug crimes in rough proportion to 
their representation in the population at large, they were sentenced at a rate 5 to 
6 times their representation in the population. Local statistics tell much the 
same story. In Columbus, Ohio, although black males compose less than 11 % 
(reporting hit rates on 1-95 in Maryland refute assumption that minorities more likely to have drugs); John 
Lamberth & American Civil Liberties Union, Report of John Lamberth. Ph.D., at 
http://www.aclu.orglcourtllamberth.html (last visited June 22, 2002); Paul Valentine, AeLU Files Suit Against 
Md. Police: Group Says Blacks Targeted Along 1-95, WASH. POST, Jun. 5, 1998, at BI (analyzing Maryland 
State Police stop and search records for first nine months of 1995). 
22. PETER VERNIERO & PAUL ZOUBEK, INTERIM REpORT OF THE STATE POUCE REVIEW TEAM 
REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 28 (1999), available at http://www.state.nj.usllpsl 
intm_ 419.pdf (last visited June 22, 2002). 
23. Office of N.Y. State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, "Stop and Frisk" Report, ch. 5, part 1 (2000) at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.uslpressireportsistop_frisklch5Jlarll.html (last visited June 22, 2002) (reporting 
statistical patterns regarding race in New York law enforcement). 
24. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, PERSONAL SEARCHES OF AIR PASSENGERS RESULTS: POSITIVE AND 
NEGATIVE, FISCAL YEAR 1998 6-8 (2000). 
25. Harris, supra note 20, at 48-52 (detailing charges of use of racial factors in Operation Pipeline). 
26. MARC MAUER & TRACY HUUNG, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
FIVE YEARS LATER 12 (1995). 
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of the population, they constitute about 90% of drug arrests.27 In Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, black males are arrested for drugs at a rate twenty times that of 
white males.28 
The Supreme Court has permitted-and to some extent invited-these 
disparities.29 Drug law enforcement is extremely difficult to accomplish 
without circumventing Fourth Amendment guarantees of freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. This is largely because drug couriers are 
difficult to identify and drug offenses are often victimless. Several doctrines 
permit the police to evade the probable cause requirement in ways that facilitate 
the search for drugs. For example, the Court permits "pretext stops," in which 
the police use the pretext of a traffic violation to stop and search for drugs.30 In 
practice, this rule permits police to stop virtually anyone on the roads and 
facilitates the use of racial profiling in choosing whom to stop because nearly 
everyone who drives a car will likely violate some traffic regulation. 
The Court's "consent search" doctrine also invites profiling. This doctrine 
allows the police to search in the absence of any individualized suspicion as 
long as they obtain "voluntary consent." The Court has refused to require the 
police when seeking consent to inform citizens that they have the right to say 
no and that exercising that right cannot be used against them.3! The Court has 
also declined to provide any protection against the use of "consent searches" in 
the inherently coercive setting of a traffic stop.32 Consent searches have 
become a particularly attractive tool for conducting searches for drugs without 
probable cause because few people refuse consent when an officer asks for it 
during a traffic stop. Significantly, profiling data suggest that racial disparities 
in searches are much more acute than in stops themselves.33 
These doctrines are themselves partly attributable to the war on drugs. 
Difficulty in identifying drug crimes, combined with the mandate to enforce 
27. JEROME G. MIu.ER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 82 (1996). 
28. Id. 
29. Infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which Supreme Court expands rights of 
officers to search despite conflicts with Fourth Amendment rights). 
30. Whren v. United States, 517 U.s. 806,811-12 (1996) (holding that pretextual motivation of police 
officer irrelevant to Fourth Amendment inquiry). 
31. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1973) (finding no requirement that police advise 
subject of search of right to refuse). The Court reasoned that requiring warnings would discourage consent and 
thereby burden police investigations. Id. 
32. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,36-37 (1996) (refusing to require police to inform detainee he can 
leave before conducting consent search in automobile stop). 
33. See generally Report of John Lamberth, supra note 21 (black, Hispanic, or other racial minorities 
made up 80.3% of the 823 motorists searched in Maryland study); Vemiero & Zoubek, supra note 22, at 27 
(black or Hispanic motorists made up 77.2% of 1,193 searches in New Jersey study); see also U.S. Customs 
Service, supra note 24 at 6-8 (reporting that blacks and Hispanics searched disproportionately more often than 
whites). 
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drug laws, has put substantial pressure on constitutional doctrine. 
Consequently, the Court has developed several doctrinal "loopholes" at the 
expense of constitutional rights by allowing the police to conduct searches for 
drugs without probable cause that a person is carrying drugs. 34 But by freeing 
officers to act without objective indicia of individualized suspicion, such 
doctrines effectively invite racially stereotyped profiling.35 
Racial disparities in the administration of the drug laws are reflected in 
growing racial disparities in incarceration. The war on drugs has been a critical 
factor in the explosion in incarceration rates in America over the past twenty-
five years, and racial targeting has meant that minorities have made up most of 
the increase in the incarcerated population. From 1925 to 1975, the 
incarceration rate in the United States was virtually flat, at about 100 
incarcerated persons per 100,000 residents.36 The rate was so steady for so 
long that criminologists developed theories for why incarceration rates would 
always remain constant.37 Those theories are no longer seriously entertained, 
however, because since 1975 the United States has experienced a nearly 400% 
increase in the incarceration rate.38 We now lead the world in per capita 
incarceration, and boast an incarceration rate 5 times higher than that of the 
next highest Western European nation.39 From 1980 to 1993, drug offenders 
made up three-quarters of the increase in the federal prison population.40 Drug 
offenders were 25% of the federal prison population in 1980, but 59% in 
1996.41 In the state prisons, drug offenders were 6% of the prison population in 
1980, but 21% in 1996.42 Today, there are nearly half a million prisoners 
34. See generally David A. Harris, Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Particularized Suspicion, 
Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REv. 975 (1998); David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means 
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994); Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: 
The Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567 (1991); see also supra notes 30-32 and 
accompanying text (discussing several cases in which Supreme Court relaxes Fourth Amendment 
requirements). 
35. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 27-55 (1999). 
36. Mauer, RACE TO INCARCERATE, supra note 17, at 17, fig. 2-1 (showing per capita incarceration rate 
ranging from 80 to 140 persons per 100,000 residents every year from 1925 to 1975). 
37. See generally Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of Punishment, 64 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1973). 
38. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, table 6.26 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire, eds., 
2000), at http://www.albany.eduisourcebooklI995/pdf/t626.pdf(last visited June 22, 2002). 
39. SENTENCING PROJECT, U.S. SURPASSES RUSSIA AS WORLD LEADER IN RATE OF INCARCERATION, at 
hnp:llwww.sentencingproject.org/brieflpublO44.pdf (last visited June 22, 2002); see also MAUER, RACE TO 
INCARCERATE, supra note 17, at 21-23 tbl. 2-1, fig. 2-3 (comparing incarceration rates of United States and 
other nations). 
40. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Prisoners in 1994, at 10, table 13 (1995). 
41. Id. 
42. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PuNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 
14 (2000). 
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incarcerated for drug offenses.43 This figure does not include the thousands of 
inmates whose offenses are drug-related, meaning that they committed a crime 
to raise money to pay the prices of drugs kept artificially high by the war on 
drugs. Nor does it take into account those driven to violence and crime by 
exposure to the criminal business of drug dealing and distribution, which would 
not exist but for the war on drugs. 
Racial minorities have borne the brunt of this incarceration boom. From 
1970 to 1996, the proportion of blacks in prison increased by 25%, while the 
proportion of blacks arrested for violent crimes dropped by 20%.44 From 1986 
to 1991, the number of white drug offenders in state prisons increased by 
110%, but the number of black offenders incarcerated grew by 465%.45 
Among juveniles during the same time period, drug arrests of minorities 
increased by 78%, while drug arrests of whites decreased by 34%.46 Today, 
black males are admitted to state prison for drug offenses at thirteen times the 
rate for white males.47 In many states, the disparities are even worse. In 
Maryland and Illinois, for example, blacks comprised 90% of those admitted to 
prison for drug offenses in 1996.48 
Like the formalist "liberty of contract" protected in Lochner, the formalist 
criminal justice response to drugs is subject to a realist critique: its formal 
neutrality masks political choices that are anything but neutral. I do not suggest 
that we should excuse harmful behavior because of social circumstances, and I 
acknowledge that the drug trade has plagued many residents of inner-city 
minority commumtIes. But the disparities identified above in the 
administration of drug law enforcement ought to prompt a reconsideration of 
the application of the necessarily formal criminal justice model. As noted 
above, I do not believe that the criminal justice model can easily accommodate 
the realist critique-in the end, formal equality is indispensable in the 
administration of criminal justice. But if that is the case, the stark disparities 
described above ought to cause us to question whether the criminal justice 
model, with its attendant formalism, is an appropriate response to the drug 
problem. A more realist regulatory approach may be appropriate-one less 
concerned with meting out sanctions in a formally neutral manner, and more 
concerned with maximizing social welfare and public health by adopting 
43. PHILLIP BEAITY, ET AL., POOR PRESCRIPTION: THE COSTS OF IMPRISONING DRUG OFFENDERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (lust. Pol'y Inst. 2000), at http://www.cjcj.orgldruglpp.html(last visited lune 22, 2002) 
(detailing nwnber of drug-related incarcerations). 
44. Michael Tonry, Crime and Punishment in America, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT I, 
18 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (comparing admissions to federal and state prisons by race). 
45. MARc MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: STATE 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN IMPRISONMENT 10 (March 1997). 
46. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE STATE OF CRiMINALIUSTlCE II (Feb. 1993). 
47. Punishment and Prejudice, supra note 42, at 2. 
48. Punishment and Prejudice, supra note 42, at 17. 
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measures that respond to the drug problem in less rigid, and quite possibly 
more effective, ways. 
III. AN AL TERNATNE APPROACH TO DRUG REGULA nON 
By all accounts, the war on drugs has been a failure. Although nearly half a 
million people are locked up for drug crimes, drugs are cheaper, purer, and 
more easily available than ever before.49 It costs about $20,000 a year to 
incarcerate someone,50 and studies consistently fmd that treatment and 
prevention are far more cost-effective responses to drug abuse. In 1997, the 
Rand Corporation reported that treatment is seven times more cost-effective 
than incarceration in reducing drug consumption.51 We spend billions of 
dollars each year in an increasingly futile effort to interdict drug imports. 52 
Further, the criminalization of drugs makes the drug trade more profitable, 
creating the incentive and opportunity for substantial organized criminal 
activity. 53 As one commentator wrote presciently in 1920, when the first laws 
criminalizing drugs were adopted: "We had not realized that the moment 
restrictive legislation made these drugs difficult to secure legitimately, the 
drugs would also be made profitable to illicit traffickers.,,54 We have created 
the conditions for criminals to make billions of dollars. Juan Garcia Abrego, 
for example, a Mexican drug gang leader, is said to be worth $15 billion. 55 
The most difficult cost of the war on drugs to measure is also the most 
important-the cost to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. 
Legitimacy is the linchpin of a legal order. If people believe in the fairness and 
legitimacy of a legal regime, they will obey the law without the need for 
substantial enforcement; if they lose faith in the system, law enforcement will 
need to resort to harsher and harsher measures. Two features of the war on 
drugs in particular corrode legitimacy. The first is the reality and perception 
that the system is unfair to minorities, subjecting them to much harsher 
49. MICHAEL MAsSING, THE Fix 9 (1998) (declaring war on drugs has not alleviated problem). 
50. BEATTY, supra note 43, at n.20. 
51. JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, ET AL., MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE 
KEy OR THE TAXPAYERS' MONEY? xvii-xviii (1997) (comparing effects of incarceration and treatment in 
preventing drug use). 
52. Massing, supra note 49, at 9; see also, MIKE GRAY, DRUG CRAZY: How WE GOT INTO THE MESS 
AND How WE CAN GET OUT 145-52 (1998) (recognizing futility of drug interdiction). Gray notes that the 
nation's annual supply of heroin could be imported in a single cargo container, that Los Angeles harbor alone 
unloads 130,000 containers a month, and that Customs checks only about 400 of them. [d. 
53. GRAY, supra note 52, at 18-21; see also generally MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF 
PROHIBITION (1991). 
54. GRAY, supra note 52, at 53 (quoting Charles Terry, former city health officer of Jacksonville, 
Florida). 
55. See GRAY, supra note 52, at 50. 
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treatment than whites.56 The second threat to legitimacy stems from the 
corruption that the war on drugs itself breeds because of the sheer amount of 
money involved. The corrupting power of the war on drugs is widespread in 
Colombia and Mexico, but it is also evident in U.S. drug and border 
enforcement. 57 
For these reasons, many involved in enforcing the war on drugs have 
acknowledged that we cannot "incarcerate ourselves out of' the drug 
problem. 58 Yet our insistence on hewing to a criminal model as our principal 
response to the drug problem makes the regulatory approach of prevention, 
education, and treatment a neglected second cousin. Former President Bill 
Clinton's drug czar, General Barry McCaffrey, repeatedly said that we cannot 
wage a "war" on drugs, and that we must emphasize treatment and 
prevention. 59 The Clinton administration, however, consistently devoted two-
thirds of its drug budget to criminal law enforcement and only one-third to 
treatment, pursuing the same rough distribution that Presidents George Bush 
and Ronald Reagan did before him. 60 As a result, there are more people 
incarcerated for drug offenses than ever before, and treatment is less available. 
In 1991, 25% of state prisoners and 16% of federal prisoners received drug 
treatment; in 1997, with many more drug-related prisoners behind bars, only 
10% of state prisoners and 9% of federal prisoners received drug treatment. 61 
The racial disparities described above playa critical role in the persistence 
of a formalist criminal model for responding to the drug problem. Imagine 
what the politics of drugs and crime would look like if the figures were 
reversed, and white males were 13 times more likely to be incarcerated for 
drugs than blacks. Indeed, we need not leave it to our imagination. In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, when white high school and college kids began 
56. See COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 169-78 (detailing costs to legitimacy attributable to 
racial double standards in the criminal justice system). 
57. GRAY, supra note 52, at 119-33 (discussing violence and corruption in Columbia and Mexico as result 
of war on drugs); see also James Stemgold, 3 of4 Officers Convicted in Police Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 2000, at A20 (reporting on convictions arising from Rampart scandal in which a Los Angeles Police 
Department Division allegedly stole drugs, fabricated evidence, and lied in court); Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 1,2000, at 32 (describing Rampart scandal). 
58. Mireya Navarro, Experimental Courts Are Using New Strategies to Blunt the Lure of Drugs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at A25. Barry McCaffrey, head of the National Drug Control Policy Office, stated 
"What we're convinced doesn't work is to just arrest people, lock them up and throw them back on the street 
the way you got them." [d.; see also Timothy Egan, War on Crack Retreats, Still Taking Prisoners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb 28., 1999, at A I (quoting McCaffrey as stating "We have a failed social policy and it has to be re-
evaluated .... Otherwise, we're going to bankrupt ourselves. Because we can't incarcerate our way out of this 
problem.") McCaffrey estimated that we could save $S billion per year were we to substitute treatment for 
incarceration for more than a quarter million Americans now in prison. Id. 
59. Supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing McCaffrey's view of war on drugs). 
60. See generally Massing, supra note 49. 
61. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND TREATMENT, STATE AND FEDERAL 
PRISONERS, 1997 \0 (I 999}. 
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smoking marijuana in large numbers, the nation's response was not to seek 
harsher sentences, mandatory minimums, and increased prison building. 
Instead, every state in the nation reduced the penalties associated with 
marijuana, with thirteen states essentially decriminalizing possession of small 
amounts altogether.62 Like the juvenile caseworkers in Brides and Steen's 
study,63 the white majority appears ready to blame and criminalize when the 
defendant is black, but to excuse and treat when the defendant is white. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The war on drugs is an area where we desperately need more realism and 
less formalism, more regulation and less criminalization. The criminal 
response is not working. It is taxing our resources, distorting our constitutional 
rights, and increasing the racial disparities that plague our criminal justice 
system. Many involved in the war itself agree that our current approach is not 
working. But the color of those we assume to be responsible for the illicit drug 
trade has allowed us to maintain the criminal model and to avoid confronting 
our own social responsibility for the problem. 
There is, however, some reason for hope. Coerced treatment appears to be a 
politically acceptable alternative to incarceration, at least with respect to 
nonviolent drug offenders. Drug courts, which offer those arrested for 
nonviolent drug crimes a program of intensive coerced treatment with regular 
drug testing in lieu of a conviction and prison sentence, have multiplied in 
recent years. In 1994, there were only twelve nationwide; today there are over 
400 drug courts, with another 200 in the planning stages.64 Initial studies have 
found drug courts more effective and cheaper than incarceration. 65 
Similarly, in recent years, voters in Arizona and California have adopted 
referenda that require their states to provide treatment rather than incarceration 
for nonviolent drug offenders.66 Arizona's law, adopted in 1996, requires 
62. See Cole, supra note 17, at 152-53. 
63. See generally Bridges & Steen, supra note 16. Bridges and Steen found juvenile caseworkers were 
far more likely to attribute criminal behavior to innate characteristics for black youth, and to poor environments 
for white youth. Id. Such findings generally lead to much harsher treatment for black youth in the juvenile 
court system. Id. 
64. David Cole, Doing Time-In Rehab: Drug Courts Keep Addicts Out of Jail, The Nation, Sept. 20, 
1999, at 20-21 (discussing new approach to dealing with nonviolent drug offenders). 
65. Id.; see also generally Steven Blenko, The Challenges of Integrating Drug Treatment into the 
Criminal Justice Process, 63 ALB. L. REv. 833 (2000); Steven Blenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical 
Review, I NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REv. 22, 24 (1998) (summarizing results from drug court evaluations). 
66. See Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act of 1996, ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-901.01-02 
(2001) (requiring courts to suspend sentencing and impose probation); California Drug Program Begins, 
Despite Los Angeles Skepticism, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,2001, at AIO (describing beginning of implementation of 
Proposition 36, which requires treatment instead of jail for first- and second-time non-violent drug offenders); 
Anna Gorman, Judges Say New Drug Law is Working, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at Bl (reporting on 
implementation of California's Proposition 36). 
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judges in certain drug cases to suspend sentences and provide probation in 
conjunction with treatment. The state estimated that the program saved over $2 
million in incarceration costs in its fIrst year of implementation. 67 In 2000, 
California voters adopted the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, 
which similarly diverts nonviolent drug offenders from prison to treatment 
programs. The California program took effect in July 2001, so it is too early to 
assess its effectiveness. But the fact that both programs were adopted by 
popular referenda suggests that there may be growing support for a public 
health response to drugs as an alternative to the criminal response. 
In addition, revelations of widespread racial proftling, combined with the 
data showing that blacks and Latinos are no more likely than whites to be 
carrying drugs or other contraband, have brought home to the public at large 
one of the real costs of the war on drugs-unequal law enforcement based on 
race. Although the terrorist attacks of September 11 th have complicated the 
picture, before September 11 th a full 80% of the American people thought that 
racial proftling was wrong.68 Many states, the federal government, and 
hundreds of cities and counties have adopted reporting requirements designed 
to identify and eliminate racial proftling. There has been more progress on this 
issue than on any other issue of inequality in criminal justice in the past twenty-
fIve years. 
These developments suggest that at least some elements of the public are 
beginning to pay more attention to both equality considerations and 
effectiveness in the war on drugs, and are beginning to call for change in the 
way that we have responded to drugs over the past twenty-fIve years. It is time 
to abandon the formal approach of the criminal justice system and the stale 
metaphor of a war on drugs. Formalism has its place in criminal justice, but the 
drug problem deserves a more realist, and more realistic, public health 
approach. 
67. Drug Treatment and Education Fund Legislative Report, FY 1997-98, at \0 (1999), available at 
http://www.supreme.state.az.uslasdldteftoday.pdf (last visited June 22, 2002) (reporting cost savings from 
diverting persons from prison to probation). 
68. Frank Newport, Racial Profiling Is Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among Young Black Men, 
GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 9, 1999 (on file with author) (presenting result of race-based poll to 
determine treatment by law enforcement). 
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